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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOAN E. DAVIS, et al., 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
No. 88-282 
Priority 14(b) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issues that Appellant Joan Davis has raised on 
appeal are properly before this Court. Respondent contends, 
however, that the record does not support the issues raised. In 
fact, contrary to the State's assertion, specific trial 
objections, counsel's arguments, the face of the record, and 
plain error sufficiently support all issues raised by Ms. Davis 
on appeal. The record also evidences that the State was aware of 
all of the issues raised on appeal and should have addressed 
these issues in its brief in chief. 
First, L. Bruce Larsen, Joan Davis's attorney at the 
forfeiture proceedings specifically objected to the use of 
statements taken in violation of Ms. Davis's Miranda Rights. 
Despite Mr. Larsen's timely objection, the trial judge 
nevertheless permitted officer McCarthy's testimony in which he 
overheard Ms. Davis make incriminating statements regardi-ng the 
Dodge Van ownership. Second, trial counsel specifically 
questioned Officer McCarthy about the lack of a seizure warrant; 
Officer McCarthy conceded that no warrant was ever issued to 
justify the Van's seizure. This line of questioning was objected 
to by the State. Mr. Larsen offered proof as required by Rule 
103.x The State now claims it lacked sufficient notice of this 
issue even though an offer of proof was presented by trial 
counsel.2 Even if the court finds Ms. Davis's offer of proof 
inadequate, the seizure, without first obtaining a warrant from 
an independant magistrate, still qualifies as plain error. 
The record also demonstrates that it was plain error 
and a violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions for 
forfeiture to take place in this case. The nature of the 
transaction, the amount involved and the absence of any other 
transaction or acknowledgement of the State's alleged transaction 
should have indicated to the trial judge that it was error for 
the van to be forfeited. The plain error test is met because the 
trial judge should have identified that forfeiture of the van 
under these circumstances was grossly disproportionate to the 
In his questions directed to Officer McCarthy, Mr. Larsen 
attempted to establish that Metro Narcotics Agents failed to follow 
appropriate procedures in executing the forfeiture process (R. 53). 
Mr. Skordas objected on the basis of relevancy (R. 53). The trial 
judge rejected a generalized inquiry into Metro Narcotics 
procedures, but allowed trial counsel to ask questions pertaining 
to inappropriate seizure in the present case (R. 54). As part of 
the inappropriate procedure line of questions, Mr. Larsen asked 
Officer McCarthy if a warrant had been issued for the seizure of 
Ms. Davis's Van. Officer McCarthy knew of no warrant, he simply 
confiscated the Van on his belief that it was "common procedure". 
2
 Mr. Larsen's line of questioning and offer of proof was 
based on inappropriate procedures followed by Metro Narcotic's 
agents when executing the forfeiture process. One question asked 
was whether it was proper procedure to take Ms. Davis's vehicle 
without a search warrant. 
2 
crime itself and a violation of the eighth amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I Section 9, of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Finally, the trial record indicates that the penalty is 
simply inconsistent with the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. The facts of the instant 
case must be considered in the context of the intent of the 
statute. Should this Court determine that the facts and plain 
intent of the statute are to be considered separately, the record 
demonstrates that it was plain error for the trial judge to order 
forfeiture in the proceeding below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUES THAT APPELLANT RAISES IN HER BRIEF IN CHIEF 
ARE PROPERLY RAISED ON APPEAL. 
(In reply to Respondentf s Point I.) 
The State of Utah argues that the issues raised by the 
Ms. Davis are improper because they were not appropriately raised 
with the trial court. (Resp. at 4). Specifically, the State 
argues that Appellant's issues I (forfeiture is unconstitutional 
because it is grossly disproportionate to crime), II (forfeiture 
of Ms. Davis's Van violates plain intent of section 58-37-13), IV 
(evidence in violation of Miranda is inadmissable in civil 
proceeding), and V (warrantless seizure invalidates proceedings 
below), supra, are improper for appeal. The State of Utah states 
that the sole issue was determined by Judge Frederick. Judge 
3 
Frederick framed the issue as "whether claimants Gerald Davis or 
his wife Joan Davis was the owner of the vehicle in question and 
whether or not the claimant Rosalee Hansen possessed a bona fide 
security interest precluding forfeiture at least to the extent of 
her, Rosalee Hansen's claimed interests." (Resp. Brief at 4-5 
citing R.38 p.4). 
The State's sweeping argument suggests that an 
appellate court must ignore objections or sub-issues raised 
during a judicial proceeding but not directly related to the 
primary issue in a case. There is no law to support such a 
proposition. Ms. Davis's issues are supported in the record by 
direct objections, or alternatively, as plain error. 
A. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE WHILE IN 
CRIMINAL CUSTODY, BEFORE A MIRANDA WARNING IS 
GIVEN, IS ADMISSABLE IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING WAS 
PROPERLY RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
(In reply to Respondentf s Point I and in support 
of Appellant's Point IV) 
The State, in its Brief, states that Ms. Davis did not 
properly object to all the issues raised on appeal. It therefore 
contends that the appellate court cannot address these issues. 
On the issue of whether testimony given in a civil proceeding may 
be relied on in a forfeiture proceeding, the State's brief has 
not addressed this issue beyond saying that the issue was not 
raised with the trial court. 
The State's argument on this point is inconsistent with 
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the trial record. Indeed, Mr. Larsen specifically objected to 
the admission of Ms. Davis's statement taken while she was in 
police custody. During the trial, when Officer McCarthy was 
asked about his conversation with Ms. Davis regarding ownership 
of the van, the following discussion took place: 
Q: [By Mr. Skordas to Officer McCarthy] What did she say to you 
and what did you say to her? 
MR. LARSEN: I'm going to object, your Honor, and the 
basis for the objection is that I believe at this point in time 
she's [Joan Davis] in custody and being asked questions. I don't 
think they're admissible in court based on the Miranda decision. 
THE COURT: Well, this is a civil procedure, is it not, 
Counsel? 
MR. LARSEN: It is. 
THE COURT: I'm not following your objection. 
MR. LARSEN: Submit it. 
(R.II 49-50). 
Trial counsel timely objected in a clear and definite 
manner to the use of testimony based on statements made in 
custody, without a Miranda warning. Officer McCarthy's 
statements were allowed into the forfeiture proceedings 
unlawfully as pointed out in Point IV of appellant's brief.3 The 
trial judge thereafter relied on Officer McCarthy's statements in 
finding that the testimony of Ms. Davis lacked credibility. 
3
 In United States v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 
(1971), cited in Point IV of Ms. Davis's brief, the United States 
Supreme court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applied with equal force in civil forfeiture 
proceedings. I_d. at 718. 
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Indeed, the use of this incriminating statement materially 
affected the trial's outcome in two ways. First, the trial court 
found that Ms. Davis's custodial admission supported the state's 
theory of ownership. Second, the trial court found that Ms. 
Davis's custodial admission was inconsistent with her testimony 
at the forfeiture hearing and materially affected her 
credibility.4 The State has failed to address the merits of 
whether Officer McCarthy's testimony was properly allowed into 
the proceedings. 
B. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE 
OF THE 1987 DODGE CARAVAN SHOULD INVALIDATE THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW (In response to the State's 
Point I and in further support of Ms. Davis's 
Point V). 
1. The trial record demonstrates that the van 
was taken without a valid seizure warrant; 
that the issue is not new on appeal. 
The State's noncompliance with Utah's forfeiture 
statute is clear and definite from a reading of the record in 
relation to the statute. During the trial proceedings the 
following colloquy took place: 
Q [By Mr. Larsen, Joan Davis' attorney at the lower court 
to Officer William McCarthy]: You've been in Metro 
Narcotics. Isn't it a fact that many of the officers 
that are involved in that are always talking about --
bragging about picking up these vehicles and getting 
Judge Frederick, in ruling that Ms. Davis's testimony was 
not credible and therefore did not support a security interest in 
either Mr. Davis or Rosalie Hanson, relied on Ms. Davis's 
statements made to Officers McCarthy and Lewellyn while she was in 
custody. See Reporter's Transcript of Judge Frederick's Ruling, 
at 3 (April 12, 1988). 
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them forfeited? 
MR. SKORDAS: 
MR. LARSEN: 
THE COURT: 
Objection, your Honor. That's not relevant. 
I think it is relevant, your Honor. I think the 
posture that the case is finding itself in is that 
there's a reason for the officer wanting to get 
that vehicle. The reason is because he wanted to 
go through the forfeiture process and this is some 
of the things that go on with the people in the 
Metro Narcotics, how they are always talking about 
and bragging about picking up certain vehicles and 
obtaining certain vehicles. 
I think it goes to the intent and credibility 
on that aspect. 
Well, Mr. Larsen, what these members of the Metro 
Strike Force do on a general basis, what they talk 
about on a general basis, I am inclined to think, 
is not relevant. 
If, on the contrary, you're able to establish 
that there is something less than a 
straightforward, appropriate attitude in the 
seizure of this particular vehicle, that is 
definitely an area of inquiry which I'll allow. 
(emphasis added) 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
MR. SKORDAS: 
THE COURT: 
Did you have a warrant to seize the vehicle? 
I don't know if he did or not. 
In fact, there was no warrant. 
Do you know of anything, even today are you 
aware of any warrant that there was to seize 
that vehicle? 
Objection, it's been asked and answered. 
Well, the witness has testified, as I recall, that 
he didn't know if there was a warrant or not for 
the seizure or an order for seizure. 
You've stated, Counsel, that there was no 
warrant. 
Q (By Mr. Larsen to Officer McCarthy): In reviewing this matter 
with Mr. Olson today, did that give you any other information 
about whether or not there was a warrant for the seizure of the 
vehicle? 
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A: I don't have any knowledge of one. 
Q: Do you have any idea of the grounds why they 
took the vehicle? 
A: Only that itys common procedure. That's the 
way I've done it. (emphasis added) 
(R.II 53-55). 
Further, the preliminary hearing transcript of Officer 
Olson (entered as an exhibit during the proceedings below) reads: 
Q (By Mr. Larsen): Do you recall any other time you were in her 
[Ms. Davis] van? 
A: Only when it was seized to search it. 
Q: And this was on what day? 
A: I think it was the 19th. The 19th of Jan. 
1988. 
Q: Did you have a search warrant for the van at 
that time? 
A: No. 
(Preliminary hearing transcript of State v. Joan Davis, Officer 
Olson's testimony at 14). 
After Mr. Skordas's objection to Mr. Larsen's line of 
questioning, Mr. Larsen continued. Judge Frederick allowed the 
offer of testimony provided that there must be "something less 
than a straightforward, appropriate attitude in the seizure of 
this particular vehicle." (R.II 54). Indeed, Mr. Larsen's 
continued questioning, revealed that the Van was confiscated by 
Metro Narcotics without first complying with the warrant 
requirement expressed in the forfeiture statute. The issue is 
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not being raised for the first time on appeal. Mr. Larsen 
questioned both Officers Olson and McCarthy in an effort to 
establish whether the officer's procedures complied with 
statutory requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 reads in pertinent part: 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture 
under this act may be seized by any peace 
officer of this state upon process issued by 
any court having jurisdiction over the 
property, (emphasis added) However, seizure 
without process may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an 
arrest or search under a search warrant or an 
inspection under an administrative inspection 
warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has 
been the subject of a prior judgment in favor 
of the state in a criminal injunction or 
forfeiture proceeding under this act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable 
cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or 
safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable 
cause to believe that the property has been 
used or intended to be used in violation of 
this act. . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
The evidence presented at the forfeiture proceeding 
established that no warrant was issued for forfeiture of the 1987 
Dodge Van (R.II. 54; Preliminary Hearing Transcript of Joan 
Davis, Officer Olson's testimony at 14). Seizure of a vehicle 
can only be "upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1988 crim. supp.) 
9 
(emphasis added).5 
Officer William McCarthy was not aware of any warrant 
to seize the vehicle and that it was not seized upon process 
issued. (R.II. 54). The grounds for taking the vehicle were 
stated by Officer McCarthy as "common procedure". (R.II. 55). 
This State action violated Joan Davis's fourth amendment rights, 
her Article I and 14 Utah Constitutional rights and Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-13.6 
Judge Frederick heard testimony of the officers' 
failure to produce a seizure warrant and their failure to seize 
the Van in accordance with process issued in compliance with 
applicable Utah law. Nevertheless, the judge did not consider 
this evidence; he instead framed the issue as whether Mr. Davis 
or Ms. Hansen maintained a security interest in the Van. See 
Transcript of Judge Frederick's Ruling (April 12, 1988). 
The state contends that the improper procedure issue was 
neither raised by the pleadings nor addressed by the trial court, 
but is instead raised for the first time on appeal. Lane v. Messer, 
731 p. 2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986). Mr. Larsen raised the issue of 
inappropriate procedure through cross-examination of Officers 
McCarthy and Olson. Trial counsel did not, however, specifically 
raise the Fourth Ammendment warrant issue in any pre-trial or post-
trial motion as would be appropriate in a criminal proceeding 
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g), 23 (Arrest of judgment), or 24 
(New trial). 
6
 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court recognize a requirement that police officers first 
demonstrate to a magistrate the existence of probable cause to 
support issuance of a search and seizure warrant. See Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213,287, n. 10 (1983), State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
267 (Utah 1985), State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). 
A reviewing court should pay great deference to a magistrate's 
determination of probable cause. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 
1364 (Utah App. 1987). 
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2. Even if the Court Finds Trial Counsel Did Not 
Correctly Raise the Warrant Issue During the Forfeiture 
Proceedings, the Doctrine of Plain Error Supports 
Reversal on this Point. 
The Utah Supreme Court's recent decisions in State v. 
Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah 1989) and State v. Verde, 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989) set out plain error standards. 
Plain error consists of errors that this Court deems harmful and, 
although not properly preserved below, their erroneous character 
is obvious. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
In Eldredge this court stated: 
the premise of rule 103(a) is assured because 
of the severe sanction that follows 
noncompliance: a refusal by the appellate 
court to consider the issue. However, the 
premise of rule 103(d) is that the ends of 
justice must not be lost sight of in the 
pursuit of procedural regularity and that 
when an error is plain, a trial court can 
legitimately be said to have had a reasonable 
opportunity to address and correct it, even 
in the absence of an objection. 
Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. Justice Stewart's dissent 
explained: 
All that our cases have required by way of 
standards for invoking the doctrine is the 
rather general requirement that the error 
must be palpable and 'made to appear on the 
face of the record and to the manifest 
prejudice of the accused. . . .' 
Id. at 24 (citing State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 898, 102, 60 P.2d 952, 
958 (1936). The opinion in Verde further explained: 
First, the error must be "plain' or 
"manifest.' This is sometimes termed an 
11 
"obviousness' requirement. After examining 
the record, an appellate court must be able 
to say "that it should have been obvious to a 
trial court that it was committing error.' 
Second, the error must be of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial 
rights of a party. In other words, applying 
the standard we explained in State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must show a 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, 
the outcome below would have been more 
favorable. 
Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, it should have been obvious to the 
trial court that the police committed error by not obtaining a 
warrant from a neutral magistrate before seizing Ms. Davis's van. 
The trial judge was aware that the seizure was done three months 
after the one alleged transaction involving the van. 
Furthermore, the trial judge was aware that the seizure was done 
without any warrant and without process. He heard testimony from 
two police officers that no warrant was issued before the Van was 
seized. He also had the opportunity to correct such error by 
addressing this issue in his Findings of Fact. In this case, the 
error of allowing forfeiture is plain, manifest, and appears 
clearly on the record. The first requirement of the plain error 
test is satisfied. 
The second prong of the plain error test - whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the 
outcome would have been more favorable is also met. Indeed, the 
purpose of the warrant requirement is to have an independent 
magistrate objectively review the facts and determine whether 
12 
probably cause justifies seizure. See Supra Note 6. Police 
officers lack justification to seize property without a warrant. 
Merely because it is the "customary" practice, as described by 
Officer McCarthy, of police officers to seize a vehicle in a 
forfeiture proceeding without subscribing to the requirements of 
the statute does not constitutionally justify such behavior. 
The failure of the court to address the Miranda issue 
also materially affected the outcome of the forfeiture 
proceedings in two crucial aspects. First, the trial judge found 
that Ms. Davis's custodial admission supported his finding of 
ownership.7 Second, the judge found that the statement 
negatively affected Ms. Davis's credibility.8 Absent this error, 
the trial outcome would have been more favorable to Ms. Davis. 
The trial judge was incorrect in allowing admission of this 
Judge Frederick specifically stated that Ms. Davis's 
statement made while in the custody of Officers McCarthy and 
Lewellyn supported the State's theory of ownership. See Reporter's 
transcript of Judge Frederick's ruling, at 4. 
8
 The credibility issue was material to Ms. Davis's case. 
Mr. Larsen established on cross-examination that the credibility 
of Officer Olson was also in question. There were several 
inconsistencies between Officer Olson's testimony at trial and his 
prior statements and reports. Judge Frederick resolved the 
credibility issue in favor of officer Olson and against Ms. Davis. 
Judge Frederick stated as follows: "This court views the testimony 
of Officer Steve Olsen as more credible than the testimony of Ms. 
Joan Davis . . ." Reporter's Transcript of Judge Frederick's 
Ruling, p. 3. The judge further stated: "The testimony of the 
petitioners in this case, in the Court's judgment, was not credible 
in certain critical particulars." Id. at 4. One of the critical 
areas affecting credibility was where "Joan Davis told the seizing 
officers, McCarthy and Lewellyn, [before being read Miranda Rights] 
that the vehicle was hers and that it was paid for. Yet she 
testified in court at trial that the vehicle belonged to her 
husband and that there were sums owed on the vehicle." Id. at 4. 
13 
statement. See U.S. Coin and Currency/ 401 U.S. 715. 
C. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THAT THE RESULT IN THIS CASE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (In reply to Respondent's 
Point I and in support of Appellant's Point I). 
Applying the plain error standard, above, it is clear 
that the Constitutions of the United States and Utah have been 
violated. 
In addition to the Constitutional error of searching 
and seizing Ms. Davis' van without a warrant, the trial judge 
acted erroneously by allowing a sentence grossly disproportionate 
to the crime committed. 
The nature of the error was manifest or obvious. The 
facts of the case, see Point I in Appellant's Brief in Chief, 
support that this was not a case that the Utah forfeiture statute 
was intended to include. In addition to the nature of the 
transaction, the amount involved and the fact that there was 
never any other transaction or acknowledgement of the State's 
alleged transaction should have indicated to the trial judge that 
it was error for the van to be forfeited. The first prong of the 
plain error test is met because the trial judge should have 
identified that forfeiture of the van under these circumstances 
was grossly disproportionate to the crime itself in violation of 
the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I Section 9, of the Utah Constitution. 
Furthermore, Ms. Davis' Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights were violated. Recognition of such a violation would have 
provided a much more favorable outcome to Ms. Davis at the 
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forfeiture proceeding. The disproportionate nature of the 
punishment considering the circumstances of the crime does not 
justify forfeiture. 
D. FORFEITURE WAS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE AND VIOLATES THE PLAIN INTENT OF UTAH'S 
FORFEITURE STATUTE (In reply to Respondent's 
Points I and II and in support of Appellant's 
Point II) 
The State's Brief in Chief divides Appellant's Point II 
into two separate issues. Ms. Davis's issues presented for 
review reads: "Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987 
Dodge Caravan supported by the facts of this case and the plain 
intent of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13?" (App. Brief in Chief at 
vii). The issue as presented in the State's Point I for 
dismissal reads: "Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987 
Dodge Caravan supported by the plain intent of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-13?" (Resp. at 4). 
The State does not provide a reason why the facts 
should not be discussed in the context of the purpose and plain 
intent of the statute. Ms. Davis's trial counsel at the lower 
court made a complete record of the factual problems in the 
context of Utah's forfeiture statute. The facts, testimony, and 
objections made and cited to in Ms. Davis's Brief in Chief on 
this point do not go to the question of whether there was a 
security interest on the vehicle, but rather go to the very facts 
in the context of the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture statute. 
The State addresses the question of forfeiture being 
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appropriate under the state's version of the facts only (Resp. 
Brief at 5-6) but does not address the factual issues in the 
context of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 and the plain intent of that 
statute. 
Ms. Davis would ask this Court to view the facts in the 
complete context of the proceedings below, according to whether 
the facts in this case justify forfeiture under the plain intent 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. While Ms. Davis acknowledges that 
the facts as presented by her witnesses are not always identical 
with the State's primary witness, Officer Olson, she would 
emphasize to the Court that either view of the facts of this case 
do not support forfeiture pursuant to the purpose and plain 
intent of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13. 
Ms. Davis has detailed the facts as presented by both 
the State and Appellant, and has provided this Court with current 
research and law regarding the purpose and intent of Utah's 
forfeiture statute in Point II of Appellant's Brief in Chief at 
13-20. There is no fact to support that Joan Davis purchased, 
sold, distributed, or transported marijuana for purposes of the 
statute on forfeiture as this Court and the Utah legislature have 
defined those terms. 
If this Court should sever the issue of whether 
forfeiture is supported by the facts of this case in the context 
of the plain intent of Utah's forfeiture statute, then Ms. Davis 
would ask this court to apply a plain error analysis. 
Ms. Davis has been accused of committing a crime which 
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has resulted in a civil forfeiture proceeding against her and her 
family's property. The facts as detailed in her Brief in Chief 
support manifest error. Ms. Davis's Constitutional rights were 
violated; the facts in this case when viewed in the context of 
Utah's Forfeiture statute do not rise to the plain intent of the 
statute as identified and defined by this Court and the Utah 
legislature. 
II. A SECURITY INTEREST FOR PURPOSES OF REGISTRATION WITH 
THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND A SECURITY 
INTEREST FOR PURPOSES OF FORFEITURE BY POLICE SEIZURE 
ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS. (In reply to Respondent's Points 
III, IV, and V VI and in support of Appellant's Point 
III.) 
The State's Points III, IV, V, and VI go to the issue 
of the existence of a security interest and what is required for 
a security interest under Utah law. In support of its 
interpretation Respondent has not cited a single Utah case.9 The 
State's heading makes the argument that "Certificate of Title is 
Absolute Evidence of Ownership" (emphasis added). The State has 
given no authority for such a proposition. 
The State uses the Oregon case of French v. Barrett, 
733 P.2d 89 (Or. 1987) for the proposition that "in applying the 
Family Purposes doctrine, the certificate of title constitutes 
prima facie evidence of ownership." (Resp. Brief at 7). The 
9
 The State cites to French v. Barrett, 733 P.2d 89 (Or. 
1987), and also cites to Kovacich v. Norgaard, 716 P.2d 633, 634 
(Mont. 1986) another non-binding opinion. 
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family purpose doctrine provides that "[a]n owner who maintains 
an automobile for the pleasure or convenience of his family is 
liable if a member of the family negligently uses the car for 
pleasure or convenience with the knowledge and consent of the 
owner." French, 733 P.2d at 91. The family purpose doctrine is 
not at issue in the instant case. 
French makes clear, however, that such prima facie 
evidence may be rebutted and overcome. See French, 733 P.2d at 
92. Ms. Davis provided rebuttable evidence at trial. She would 
ask this Court to review the rebuttable evidence presented in 
Point III of Appellant's Brief in Chief. Furthermore, the Utah 
Code does not require a perfected security interest, but only a 
bona fide interest and permits anyone that claims an interest in 
the vehicle to petition the Court for a release of that interest. 
When Ms. Davis submitted her initial brief, she was 
unaware of Utah Case Law on the issue of whether an unperfected 
security interest constitutes a bona fide security interest under 
Utah's forfeiture statute. On March 15, 1989, the Utah Court of 
Appeals decided State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, 771 P.2d 682 
(Utah App. 1989). The issue presented in that case, as in the 
present case, was whether an unperfected security interest in a 
forfeited automobile could be recovered by the third persons 
holding the interest. In the Pontiac Trans Am case, the state 
seized defendant's Trans Am after arresting him for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute. The State subsequently 
initiated forfeiture proceedings. 
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In One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, the Lauritos, defendant's 
grandparents, loaned defendant money to purchase the Trans Am. 
At the trial, the Lauritos produced an unperfected security 
document evidencing the loan. The trial court held that even 
though the Lauritos did not have a perfected security interest in 
the Trans Am, the grandparents still nevertheless believed they 
had a lien against the auto to secure their loan. Accordingly, 
the trial court ordered forfeiture subject to the Lauritos's 
$3,883 interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
decision. 771 P.2d at 686. 
The Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
There is nothing in the context of § 58-
37-13 suggesting the Legilsature intended 
"bona fide" to be interpreted other than 
according to its plain meaning, and we, 
therefore, reject the State's argument that 
the forfeiture statute should be interpreted 
as recognizing only perfected security 
interests as "bona fide". The Utah 
Legilature did not specify that a security 
interest must be perfected before it is 
protected under the criminal forfeiture 
statute, rather the Legislature merely stated 
it must be "bona fide." (emphasis added) 
Id. 771 P.2d at 685 
The Court of Appeals held that a security interest is 
"bona fide" under the forfeiture statute if a third party can 
establish an "actual, good faith interest in the property not 
derived by fraud or deceit." 16. In the instant case, Rosalee 
Hanson loaned Mr. & Mrs. Davis $10,000 to purchase the Dodge Van. 
Ms. Hanson and Mr. Davis executed a written agreement in which 
Mr. Davis agreed to make monthly payments to Ms. Hansen. As in 
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the Pontiac Trans Am case, Ms. Hansen failed to properly perfect 
her security interest. She believed, however, as did the 
Lauritos, that the Davis's would repay the loan and that she had 
a valid lien against the Van to secure the loan. Furthermore, 
the State does not claim that either Mr. Davis or Rosalee Hansen 
knew of the alleged illegal use of the Van for transportation of 
drugs. Under the facts presented in the instant case, the Court 
should conclude that Ms. Hanson maintained a bona fide security 
interest within the meaning of section 58-37-13. See One Pontiac 
Trans Am, 771 P.2d at 685. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons and reasons 
stated in Appellant's Brief in Chief, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the opinion of the lower court 
allowing for forfeiture of the 1987 Dodge Van and remand the case 
to the district court for either dismissal with return of the van 
(or its approximate value) or a new hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this ,^C) day of June, 1989. 
'CUtrPl 
L. p a r i e s Spafforc^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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